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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of foreign aid on government' s
fiscal behaviour. We have tried to do this by using and simulating a model whic h
explicitly allows for interactions between the non-bank private sector, th e
government sector, the banking sector and the external sector and which als o
allows for supply side effects. This is in marked contrast to the existing literatur e
which only examines this issue by confining itself to the government sector.1
Introduction
Recently there has been a considerable renewal of interest about the effects of aid
on the public sector's fiscal behaviour (see White, 1994; Khan and Hoshino ,
1992; Pack and Pack, 1990 and 1993: Gang and Khan, 1991 and 1994, amon g
others). Almost all of these works take Heller's (1975) work as their startin g
point. While not all of them necessarily do this, basically this literature asks tw o
questions. The first is about the "fungibility" of foreign aid assuming that all ai d
is allocated to the public sector. Foreign aid is said to be  fungibil when governent
investment does not increase by the inflow of aid notwithstanding that it i s
intended for government investment. The second relates to the total effect of ai d
on different public sector variables, particularly those entering the governmen t
budget constraint.
These two questions have been generally examined within some varian t
of Heller's model. This has generally meant specifying and solving a model o f
government's behaviour in the presence of foreign aid and then estimating th e
model, using either country specific or  cross-section data, for calculating the total
impact of aid from the reduced form of the model on the variables of interest. A s
a by-product sometimes the estimated model also provides estimates of th e
parameters which can be used to examine the question about "fungibility".
This literature suffers from a number of shortcomings. The first one wa s
pointed out by White (1993). Using a very simple example he showed that onc e
we allow for the role of the behaviour of other economic agents in the economy ,
the effects of aid on the fiscal variables may well be quite different. Essentiall y
what this means is that in order to estimate the total effect of aid on the behaviour
of fiscal variables we should, as far as possible, use a model which not onl y
includes the government sector but other sectors as well so that we can examin e
the implications of interactions between various parts of the economy for th e
effect of aid on government's behaviour. A second shortcoming is that thi s
literature only examines the ex-post "fungibility" of aid from the actual data. Bu t
a more interesting question to ask is: what happens to the effect of aid on th e
government's behaviour if we change the degree of fungibility regardless of th e
type of model used? The importance of this question can hardly be overstresse d
given the fact that this is often one of the major concerns of the donors. The fina l
shortcoming is the assumption of this literature that all aid is assigned to th e2
government sector. We might well ask: what if all or part of the aid was allocated
to the private sector? The existing literature has virtually nothing to say on how to
deal with these shortcomings.
Therefore the aim of this paper is threefold. First, it specifies a mode l
which integrates the government sector along with the non-bank private, th e
banking and the external sector as well as allows for the supply side effects which
are entirely ignored in this branch of the literature. Second, using this model w e
examine the implications of changes in the degree of fungibility of foreign aid i n
the public sector. Third, we examine the implications of allocating aid to th e
private sector as well as of changes in the degree of fungibility of aid in thi s
sector. As already mentioned, since the existing literature only concentrates o n
the demand determined models, we also shed light on the implications o f
including the supply side effects. Unlike the existing literature, we simulate ou r
model to examine these questions.
The scheme of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section  1 we specify
the model. Section 2 explains the simulations performed and the simulatio n
strategy. In Section 3 we report and discuss the various simulations. The paper i s
concluded with a brief summary and policy implications.
1. The Model
1
The model consists of four sectors: a government sector, a non-bank privat e
sector, a banking sector and an external sector. The list of the notation and th e
definitions of the variables used is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Notations and Definitions used in the Model
All variables are in real terms, denoted in domestic currency, unless state d
otherwise.
represents change in the value of a variable, i.e., x = x-x(-1).
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES3
expected (and actual) rate of domestic inflation
e
A foreign aid (denoted in domestic currency)
b government bonds
C private consumption p
C government consumption g
e exchange rate (an increase represents a depreciation of the hom e
currency)
e expected (and actual) rate of depreciation of the home currency
e
f foreign assets
f* real foreign assets denoted in foreign prices
i lending rate of the formal banking sector lb
i lending rate of the informal banking sector lu
I government investment g
imp imports
imp* real imports denoted in foreign prices
IP interest payments of the government g
IP interest payments of the formal private banks p
IP interest payments of the informal banks u
IP interest payments of the foreign sector f
k physical capital of the private sector
k physical capital of the government sector g
k total stock of physical capital T
L private loans from the formal private banking sector p
L private loans from the informal banking sector u
L government borrowing from the formal private banking sector g
L transfers from the central bank to the government  cb
m formal bank deposits
p domestic price level
R reserves of formal banks
R reserves of informal banks u
S private savings p
T government tax revenue
u informal bank deposits4
W net private wealth
x exports
y production







* expected (and actual) world rate of inflation
A* (real) foreign aid denoted in foreign prices
h the required reserve ratio of the formal banking sector f
h reserve ratio of the informal banking sector u
i nominal rate of return on bonds b
i nominal rate of return on formal bank deposits m
i nominal rate of return on private capital k
i nominal rate of return on informal bank deposits u
p* world price level
We start the presentation of the model by presenting the accounting framewor k
for the entire model (Table 2). The columns of this table show the budge t
constraints of the different sectors.
Table 2: The accounting framework of the model
1. GS 2. PS 3. CB 4. PB 5. UB 6. ES Total
1. Non-financial trans. C +I -T+IP C + k-y IP IP x-imp+IP 0 g g g p d p u f
2. Bonds - b b 0
3. Deposits m+ u - m - u 0
4. Foreign Assets/Aid -(1- )A f- A - f+A 0
5. Loans - L - L - L - L L - R- R L + L + R L + R 0 g cb p u cb u p g u u
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GS stands for government sector; PS stands for non-bank private sector; C B
stands for central bank; PB stands for formal private banks: UB stands fo r
informal private banks and ES stands for the external sector.
The Government Sector
The government's expenditure consists of expenditure on consumption, invest -
ment and interest payments on outstanding government debt and stock of loan s
from the formal private banking sector. These expenditures are financed by taxes,
by transfers from the central bank, by borrowing from the public (bond issue) and
from the private formal banking sector and by foreign aid. 
In order to explain the derivation of the government equations in ou r
model we start by specifying the utility function used by Heller (1975)
where the corresponding variables with the 'asterisk' represent target values.
2
This utility function has been criticized by Binh and McGillivray (1993) .
They show that the utility function implies that maximum utility for th e
government is not achieved in the case where government consumption ,
government investment, taxes and borrowing are set at the target values, whic h
was the basic justification for the utility function. Binh and McGillivray (1993 )
show that maximum government's utility is reached in the case wher e
government consumption and investment overshoots the target values for thes e
variables and when taxes and government borrowing are lower than their targe t
values. Clearly, this implies that Heller's method leads to inconsistent results.
As a solution to the above-mentioned problem, Binh and McGillivra y
(1993) propose to delete the additive terms in the public authorities utilit y
function. Therefore the utility function we use in the model is given by:
3
  (1)
 Cg IPg 1T 2 b 3 Lcb 4
ep
p
(1 )A 5 Lg
Ig (1 1)T (1 2) b (1 3) Lcb (1 4) ep
p










It should be pointed out that the utility function does not include governmen t
bonds because in our model, as shown below, their supply is entirely determine d
by the demand for government bonds of the non-bank private sector. 








Equation (4) allows us to take into account net real interest payments, includin g
capital gains and losses, of the government, which are often ignored in th e
literature dealing with the subject under consideration. But, as pointed out b y
Blinder and Solow (1973) long time ago, this omission can have seriou s
consequences. Equation (5) allows us to consider the implications of transfer s
from the central bank to the government. These transfers consist of the reserve s
of both the formal and informal banking sectors which are held at the centra l
bank and distributed to the government in the form of a non-interest payin g
transfer. The transfers are residually derived from the budget constraint of th e
central bank (see Table 2) and are thus given by equation (5). It should be note d
that in contrast to other work in this field (see Fry, 1989) we do not assume tha t
these transfers are only used for unproductive government expenditures, but tha t
they may also affect government investment.
According to these constraints (1- ) determines the amount of foreign aid
that is channelled via the government sector and   It should be noted
that we have taken into account that the real value of aid, denominated i n
domestic currency, may change by movements in the real exchange rate even i f
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aspects of these constraints are worth noting. First, that in virtually all studies 
is assumed to be zero, implying that the government does not borrow fo r
consumption purposes. However, this assumption has been criticized by Whit e
and Luttik (1994) on the basis of empirical evidence. The above constraint s
incorporate this criticism, by letting   to be a free parameter, varying betwee n
zero and unity. Second, all other models assume that   is zero, thereby imposin g
the restriction that all aid is allocated to the government sector. The use of   as a
free parameter allows us to examine the implications of aid allocations to th e
private sector.
The issue of fungibility is examined by considering the value of  . If it
is zero, foreign aid is said to be not fungible. It is being used precisely for th e
purpose it is being provided for, namely, to finance investment. If, however,   is
significantly greater than zero but less than unity, then partial fungibility i s
indicated. The closer the value of   to unity, the greater the degree o f
fungibility.
We can solve for I , C ,  L  and T by maximizing equation (1)  subject to g g g
equations (2) and (3). For purposes of simulation, assuming that transfe r
payments from the central bank to the government, real interest payments of th e
government, the real exchange rate and demand for government bonds ar e
exogenous for the government, the equations for these variables are given b y
equation (2) for C  (with IP  transferred to the righthand side), equation (3) for I , g g g
and equations (6) and (7) for T and  L , given below.  g
  (6)
  (7)
The next step in our approach is to specify the target variables. In line with  e.g.
Heller (1975), Khan and Hoshino (1992) and White (1994), they are, admittedl y
rather ad hoc, modelled as
(8)
  (9)T 4 y 1
Lg 5y 1
Lg Lg 1 Lg















Finally, the evolution of the stock of government loans from the formal bankin g




This completes the modelling of the government sector. 
Non-bank private Sector
The non-bank private sector is assumed to be a consolidated sector consisting o f
households and firms. The non-bank private sector holds five assets: governmen t
bonds, physical capital, deposits of the formal banking sector and those of th e
informal banking sector and an inflation hedge, say foreign currency.  The
4
private sector, which is considered to be credit constrained, receives credit fro m
the formal and the informal banking sectors as well as grants in the form o f
foreign aid. The real budget constraint from the non-bank private sector, whic h
can be derived from column 2 in Table 2, reads
  (14)
where  . 
The asset demand equations and the consumption equation of the non -
bank private sector are derived by using a  multivariate adjustment function for an
integrated model of portfolio selection and consumption-savings decision ,
proposed by Owen (1981). Owen's model is based on the works of Brainard an d
Tobin (1968), Purvis (1978), Smith (1978) and Pissarides (1978), among others .
For reasons of convenience and since parameter values were not available, w e
assume that all cross adjustment coefficients are zero. The asset deman d
equations of the non-bank private sector, taking into account the implications o f
the assumption that this sector is credit constrained, are then given by:m 1yd 2W 3 Lp 4(im
e) 5(ik
e)
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The consumption function is given by:
  (19)
Note that the consumption equation does not include current wealth. This i s
because in Owen's model (1981) it is explicitly assumed that the end of perio d
wealth is a consequence of the consumption-savings decision and not  a
determinant of it. With respect to the interest rates it is assumed that the negativ e
substitution effect exceeds the positive income effect. It should be pointed ou t
that all nominal rates of return, except for the expected rate of depreciation, ar e
assumed to be exogenously given, but  not the real rates of return since inflation is10
treated as being endogenously determined (see below). With respect to the asse t
demand equations, it is assumed that the coefficients of disposable income an d
wealth are positive, implying that all assets are normal goods. The asset deman d
are assumed to be positively affected by the own rates of return and negatively by
the alternate ones, implying that the assets are gross substitutes.
The inclusion of private credit and foreign aid in the asset and th e
consumption equation warrants some explanation. These terms are meant t o
represent liquidity constraints for firms as well as for households. There i s
considerable evidence that households face such constraints in developin g
countries caused by the presence of incomplete credit markets (see, for example ,
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993 and Jappelli and Pagano, 1994). The presence o f
the credit and foreign aid variables in the consumption equation is meant t o
capture the role of such market imperfections. A somewhat analogous argumen t
may be advanced for the asset demand equations. 
It is noteworthy to underline a special feature of our model,  which makes
it different from all other models in this field. Our model allows for aid to b e
channelled through the government sector or through the private sector. There are
some other studies which have taken into account that foreign aid may not onl y
have a direct effect on government expenditures but also on private expenditure s
(see e.g. Mosley, 1987; Mosley et al. 1987 and White, 1993). However, in thes e
studies it is incorrectly assumed that the total amount of foreign aid enters bot h
the government equations and the equations for the private sector. Hence, in these
studies both (1- ) in the government equations and   in the equations for the
private sector are set at one. It seems as if these studies confuse the structural and
the reduced form effects of foreign aid. To explain this somewhat more we ma y
consider the effects of aid on the private sector. If foreign aid is allocated to bot h
the public and the private sectors, the private sector may be affected by bot h
types of aid, but probably not in the same way. Foreign aid which  is allocated via
the private sector has a direct effect on private sector's behaviour, e.g. via it s
budget constraint which includes aid. Foreign aid which is allocated via th e
public sector only indirectly affects the privates sector through private disposabl e
income which is affected by taxes which in their turn are affected by foreign ai d
to the government. Thus the effect of aid to the private sector represents  a
structural effect, whereas that of the aid to the government sector a reduced for m10 30 50 60 0 20 1
20
Sp yd Cp
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effect. In any case even if both types of aid have a direct effect, to use total aid as
the appropriate variable in the equations for the private sector (and of th e
government sector) implies that both types of aid have the same effect on th e
private variables, an assumption which should be a testable hypothesis rather than
an imposed restriction. 
A word is in order here about how we deal with fungibility of aid in th e
private sector. We assume that there is no fungibility of aid i f
 and  . In that case foreign aid has only  a
direct effect on private investment. The closer the value of   to zero, the
greater the degree of fungibility.      




The adding-up restrictions of the above submodel for the non-bank private secto r
can be easily derived following the procedure given in Owen (1981). We do no t
specify them here since they were used in the simulations only for deriving th e
numerical values of some of the parameters involved, rather than formall y
imposed on the model in simulations. In the simulations the demand for foreig n
currency is derived from the budget-constraint. Therefore, an explicit equatio n
for the demand for foreign currency is not specified. 
Disposable income is defined as:
(22)
Finally, the evolution of the stocks demanded can be formulated as follows:
  (23)k k 1 k k 1
m m 1 m
u u 1 u
f f 1 f
Lp m R IPp Lg







This sector consists of three subsectors: the central bank, the formal private banks
and the informal credit markets. The formal private bank lends to the non-ban k
private sector and the government. Liabilities of the formal private bank consis t
of bank deposits of the non-bank private sector. The informal bank lends only t o
the non-bank private sector. Liabilities are in the form of informal deposits hel d
by the non-bank private sector. Both types of banks are assumed to hold reserve s
at the central bank. The budget constraint of the central bank is already give n
above (see also column 3 in Table 2). The budget constraints of the forma l
private bank and the informal private bank can be derived by column 4 and 5 i n
Table 2. The supply of formal and informal loans is residually determined b y
these budget constraints, hence
  (28)
  (29)
It should be noted that the budget constraint for the formal banking sector is a n
important channel in our model by which the government sector may affect th e
non-bank private sector. If government loans from the banking sector increase ,
ceteris paribus, available credit for the non-bank private sector declines.  This e.g.
negatively affects private investment. Otherwise, if government's demand fo r
formal loans declines, for instance due to an increase in foreign aid, credi t
available for the non-bank private sector increases.R hf m
Ru hu u
Lp Lp 1 Lp
Lu Lu 1 Lu
Lcb Lcb, 1 Lcb
IPp (im
e)m 1 (ilb
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Reserves of both banking sectors are assumed to be equal to a fixe d
percentage of bank deposits, hence
  (30)
  (31)




Taking into account capital gains (losses) on reserves net real interest payment s
of both types of banks are specified as:
  (35)
  (36)
The lending rates are determined by the zero-profit condition for the bankin g




In rate of change, real exports and real imports denoted in foreign prices ar e
specified as a function of the real exchange rate:
  (39)imp
imp 1
7( e e e )
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  (40)
The level of exports and imports is then given by
  (41)
  (42)
In real domestic prices imports are defined as:
  (43)
Real foreign interest payments, denoted in domestic prices, are defined as
  (44)
Note that real interest payments on foreign currency only refer to capital gains o r
losses. The change in foreign assets is determined by portfolio behaviour of th e
non-bank private sector. Development aid (denoted in foreign currency) i s
exogenous.
Aggregate demand, aggregate supply, inflation and exchange rates
With private investment, private consumption, government consumption ,
government investment and imports and exports already determined, we ca n
write aggregate demand as:
(45)
Assuming that firms are operating in a labour surplus economy and using  a
Leontief type technology, aggregate supply is determined by
(46)
wherekT k kg
y s y d
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(47)
and   is the marginal capital output ratio (which also represents the averag e
capital output ratio in our case) assumed to be constant. It should be noted tha t
equation (46) implies that the productivity of the public and private capital i s
identical. Although we do not do this, this restriction can be easily relaxed. 
The goods market is closed by price changes. We assume that good s
prices are determined by the equilibrium condition on  the goods market, i.e. from
the following condition:
  (48)
Inflation is then given by the relative change of prices, i.e.
(49)
It should be noted that the balance of payments (the budget constraint of th e
external sector: column 6 in Table 2) is automatically in equilibrium in the cas e
where aggregate demand equals aggregate supply and the budget constraints o f
the other sectors hold. This implies that there are no changes in foreign reserve s
that might affect domestic money supply. 
With respect to the expected devaluation of the exchange rate, we assume
that it gradually adjusts to purchasing power parity. This implies:
  (50)
By assuming different values for   we are now able to simulate with a fixe d
exchange rate regime, or a flexible exchange rate regime in which exchange rates




The above model is simulated using coefficients from available econometri c
studies on developing countries. If available, the coefficients are based o n
econometric studies for India done by Gupta (1993a and 1993b). The remainin g
coefficients are mainly based on studies for Asian developing countries. Thi s
implies that they do not pertain to a specific country. Estimates with respect t o
the coefficients in the equation of demand for informal deposits and with respec t
to the coefficients for informal credit in the asset demand and consumptio n
equations are not available. Admittedly rather ad-hoc, we assumed that forma l
and informal credits affect asset demand and consumption alike. Further, w e
assume that the composite coefficients in the asset demand equations have th e
property of symmetry, i.e.   =  ;   =   etc. 5 14 6 24
Table 3 gives the parameters of the asset  demand equations as well as the
parameters for private consumption.  
Table 3: Parameters of the asset demand equations and private consumption
F. Deposits Capital Bonds I. Deposits Cons.
=0.03 =0.03 =0.005 =0.03 =0.7 1 11 21 31 41
=0.08 =0.2 =0.107 =0.02 =0.255 2 12 22 32 43
=0.2 =0.258 =0.035 =0.2 =0.005 3 13 23 33 44
=0.04 =0.061 =0.087  =0.087 =0.005 4 14 24 34 45
=0.06 =0.1 =0.002 =0.005 =0.005 5 15 25 35 46
=0.009 =0.02 =0.043 =0 =0.255 6 16 26 36 47
=0.018 =0.011 =0.018 =0.027 =0.255 7 17 27 37 48
=0.087 =0.0005 =0 =0.041 =0.255 8 18 28 38 49
=0.2 =0.258 =0.035 =0.2 =0.015 9 19 29 39 41
=0.5 =0.18 =0.3 =0.5 1 11 21 31
Sources: Morisset (1993), Gupta (1993a), Ogawa  et al (1994).  
Table 4 presents the parameters for the government equations, the initial value s




Table 4: Parameters of the Government equations, Initial Values and Exogenous
Variables
Utility Budget Target Exog. Exog. Vari- Start Values Start Start
function  constraints Variables Variables ables Values Values
=2.4 =0.8 =0.04 i =0.05 A*=0.0119 f*=0.746 W=3 b=0.12 1 1 1 m
=1.6 =0.2 =0.05 i =0.05 h =0.05 l =0.27 k =1 m=0.4 2 2 2 k f p g
=2.7 =0.6 =0.95 i =0.05 h =0.05 l =0.081 k=2 C =0.14 3 3 3 b u u g
=0.8 =0.6 =0.2 i =0.06 =0.05 l =0.11 u=0.085 y, y =1 4 4 4 u g d
=0.6 =0.01 p*=1 *=0 imp*=0.24 x=0.22 p,e,p*=1 5 5
Sources: Utility function parameters: Gupta 1993b. Budget constraint parameters:
 and   from Gupta (1993b);  ,   and   are exogenously set.   is assumed to 1 4 2 3 5 2
be low, in line with other studies (in many studies this variable is set at 0.0). Fo r
 and   we have assumed the same value as for  . Target variables: from 3 5 4
Gupta (1993b) and Heller (1975).   is exogenously set. With respect to th e 5
starting variables we took averages for a group of Asian countries (IMF, IFS an d
World Bank, World Tables). Where figures for the whole group of Asia n
countries were not available, figures for India are used (IMF, IFS). Th e
remaining non-available starting values are constructed in a way that they ar e
consistent with the budget constraints. Note, that all initial values are given a s
percentages of GDP (y).  
Some other assumptions:   in the aggregate supply equation is set at  0.33,   and
 in the equation for exports and imports are set at 0.85 and -0.85, respectivel y
(based on Marquez, 1990).   in the exchange rate equation is set at 0. Hence, we
simulated with a fixed exchange rate regime. However, note that the rea l
exchange rate is not constant since inflation is endogenous. In fact this implie s
that the goods market is cleared by changes in the real exchange  rate. Finally, the
value of  , the distribution of foreign aid, is exogenously set at zero, or at one ,
depending on the specific simulation (see below). The coefficients with respect to
foreign aid in the private sector (the asset demand equations  and the consumption
equation) are explained below.4
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3. The Different Simulations and the Simulation Strategy
To examine the effects of foreign aid on the public sector our model can b e
simulated in a variety of ways. However, we confine our simulations to the thre e
questions posed in the introduction, namely, are the effects of foreign aid o n
fiscal behaviour different: 1) if feedback effects with other sectors in the mode l
are taken into account; 2) if there is a change in the degree of fungibility o f
foreign aid; and 3) if foreign aid is channelled through the private sector o r
through both sectors.
The first question is examined by comparing three simulations.  In this set
of simulations we have assumed that all aid is channelled through the government
sector (i.e. the value of   is assumed to be zero) and that the degree of fungibility
in the government sector, as determined by  , is as given in Table 4. Hence ,
there is partial fungibility. We start by simulating effects of an increase in foreign
aid on government expenditures (investment and consumption), taxes an d
borrowing from the formal banking sector when feedback effects with the othe r
sectors are not taken into account. This is done by considering the endogenou s
variables in the equations for the government sector, which are related to th e
other sectors, as exogenous variables. For our model this implies that  k, y, e, p,
b,  ,  L  and IP  are assumed to be exogenous. We have used the followin g
e
cb g
values for these variables: y, e and p are  set at 1;   is set at 0 (for these variables
e
we have used the start values used in the full model);  L ,  b and IP  are cb g
assumed to be 0 and finally,  k is set at 0.15. 
In the second simulation we examine the effects of an increase in foreig n
aid on fiscal behaviour, taking into account the feedback effects with the othe r
sectors, but assuming that the country operates in a demand determined economy.
This is done by abstracting from the supply side of the model, and hence b y
assuming that inflation is zero and that GDP is determined by the demand  side of
the model (i.e. by equation 45). 
In the third simulation we assess the effects of aid on fiscal behaviou r
using our full model, i.e. by taking into account all feedback effects and th e
supply side of the model. The second question is examined by two simulations .
Also for these simulations we have assumed that all foreign aid is channelle d
through the government sector. Moreover, we have used our full model ,4 1
4 0
10 3; 20 13; 30 23; 40 33 50 43.
20 1
10 30 40 50 0
50 1 10 20 30 40 0
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including the supply side, in these simulations. The two simulations differ wit h
respect to the degree of fungibility. We examine two extreme cases: 1) when ai d
is totally fungible, which in our model implies that   and 2) when there is
no fungibility at all, i.e.  . 
   The third question is examined by three simulations. In this set o f
simulations it is assumed that all foreign aid is channelled through the privat e
sector, i.e. the value of   is assumed to be one, and we have used the full model ,
including the supply side. With respect to the way how foreign aid affects th e
private sector, we distinguish three cases. First, it is assumed that foreign ai d
affects the private sector in exactly the same way as it is affected by credit fro m
the domestic banking sectors. This implies tha t
 and   We may call this a
situation of partial fungibility for the private sector. Second, it is assumed that al l
foreign aid is used for private investment, i.e.   and
, which implies no fungibility for the private sector .
Third, it is assumed that foreign aid is only used for private consumption, i.e .
 and   .  This simulation represents ful l
6
fungibility for the non-bank private sector. 
For all simulations we compare a baseline simulation in which foreig n
aid (denominated in foreign prices) has the value as specified in Table 3, with  a
simulation in which foreign aid has a value ten times the value as given in Tabl e
3. Thus, we examine the effect of a sustained increase in aid rather than the effect
of a transitory increase in aid. 
In principle we can simulate the effect on each one of the variable s
included in the government budget constraint. However, to save space and fo r
sharper focus we only concentrate on three variables, namely C , I  and T. In g g
each figure we present the value of the variable before the increase in ai d
(denoted with a zero after the variable), the value of the variable after th e
increase in aid (denoted with a 1 after the variable) and the difference betwee n
the two, i.e. the effect of the increase in aid (denoted with a D  after the variable).
On the horizontal axes of all figures the simulation periods are given. 20
3. The Simulation Results
The implications of feedback effects
The results for the first simulation are given by figures 1-3. Figure 1 gives th e
effect on government consumption (CG), figure 2 gives the effect  on government
investment (IG) and figure 3 gives the effect on taxes (T). 21
figure 1: no feedbacks, effects on government consumption22
figure 2: no feedbacks, effects on government investment23
figure 3: no feedbacks, effects on taxation24
The figures show that, when feedback effects with the rest of the economy ar e
not taken into account, foreign aid has a positive effect on governmen t
consumption and investment and a negative effect on taxes. 
The results for the second simulation are given by the figures 4-6.25
figure 4: demand determined model, effects on government consumption2627
figure 5: demand determined model: effects on government investment 28
figure 6: demand determined model, effects on taxation29
Also for this simulation foreign aid has a positive effect on governmen t
consumption and taxes. However, whereas in the model without feedback effect s
an increase in foreign aid has a negative effect on taxes the effect is positive i n
the case where the feedback effects are taken into account. The reason for this i s
obvious. The increase in foreign aid has a positive effect on GDP (y), as can b e
seen in figure 7, which indirectly stimulates taxes  via the target level of taxes and
the target level of government investment.  30
figure 7: demand determined model, effects on GDP3132
Results for the third simulation are displayed by the figures 8-10. It is interestin g
to compare this simulation with the first and the second simulation. For our ful l
model, in line with the other two simulations, it appears that foreign ai d
stimulates government consumption and investment. However, the effects o n
taxes differ substantially. In the model without feedback effects it was negativ e
for the entire simulation period, for the model with feedback effects, but withou t
supply side, it was positive and for the full model, it was negative for the firs t
simulation periods and then became approximately zero.33
figure 8: full model, effects on government consumption3435
figure 9: full model, effects on government investment36
figure 10: full model, effects on taxation37
An important reason for the different outcomes for the full model with an d
without supply side are again the effects of foreign aid on GDP. For the ful l
model, including the supply side, it appears that an increase in foreign aid onl y
has a minor positive effect on GDP, as can be seen in figure 11.  38
figure 11: full model, effects on GDP39
The implications of different degrees of fungibility
We start by showing the effects of an increase in foreign aid assuming tha t
foreign aid is only used for government consumption, i.e. there is full fungibility .
The results are given by figures 12-14. In the other simulation we examine th e
extreme opposite, i.e. all aid is used for government investment, i.e. there is n o
fungibility. The results of this simulation are given by figures 15-17.40
figure 12: full fungibility, effects on government consumption41
figure 13: full fungibility, effecs on government investment42
figure 14: full fungibility, effects on taxation43
figure 15: no fungibility, effects on government consumption44
figure 16: no fungibility, effects on government investment45
figure 17: no fungibility, effects on taxation46
It appears that an increase in foreign aid has a strong positive effect o n
government consumption when all foreign aid is used for governmen t
consumption. If all aid is used for government  investment, however, the effect on
government consumption is negative during the first part of the simulation period,
and positive after 7 years. When all aid is used for government consumption th e
effect on government investment and taxes is negative, whereas the effect i s
positive for both variables in the case where aid is only used for governmen t
investment. 
The difference between the results again can be explained by considerin g
the movement of GDP. The effects of an increase in aid on GDP, for the ful l
fungibility and no fungibility case, respectively, are given in figures 18 and 19. I t
appears that GDP is positively affected when all aid is used for governmen t
investment, whereas it is negatively affected when it is only used for governmen t
consumption.47
figure 18: full fungibility, effects on GDP4849
figure 19: no fungibility, effects on GDP50
The implications of the way foreign aid is channelled through the economy
The results of the three simulations done to examine this question are given i n
figures 20-28. 51
figure 20: partial fungibility, effects on government consumption5253
figure 21: partial fungibility, effects on government investment54
figure 22: partial fungibility, effects on taxation55
figure 23: no fungibility, effects on government consumption56
figure 24: no fungibility, effects on government investment57
figure 25: no fungibility, effects on taxation58
figure 26: full fungibility, effects on government consumption59
figure 27: full fungibility, effects on government investment60
figure 28: full fungibility, effects on taxation61
In the first simulation (figures 20-22) it is assumed that all foreign aid i s
channelled through the private sector and that foreign aid is used exactly in th e
way formal credit is spend, i.e. the partial fungibility case. It appears that foreig n
aid has a minor positive effect on government consumption and  investment in the
first simulation periods and a minor negative effect after 5 and 9 years ,
respectively. The effect on taxes is minor.
In the second and third simulation it is also assumed that foreign aid i s
only channelled through the private sector. But now, it is only used fo r
investment, i.e. no fungibility (figures 23-25) or for consumption, i.e. ful l
fungibility (figures 26-28). The results clearly  show that the impact of foreign aid
on governments fiscal behaviour substantially depends on how the private secto r
uses foreign aid. If it is only used for private investment, foreign aid has  a
positive effect on government consumption, government investment and taxes .
However, if it is only used for private consumption purposes, foreign ai d
negatively affects government consumption after 4 years, and negatively affect s
government investment and taxes during the whole simulation period.
Again the differences may be explained by the effect on GDP. Th e
effects on GDP for the three cases are shown by figures 29-31.62
figure 29: partial fungibility, effects on GDP63
figure 30: no fungibility, effects on GDP64
figure 31: full fungibility, efects on GDP65
It appears that foreign aid has a small negative effect on GDP when aid is spen d
in the way formal credit is used (figure 29). Alternatively, GDP is positivel y
affected when foreign aid is used for private investment (figure 30). Finally, it i s
negatively affected when foreign aid is only used for private consumptio n
purposes (figure 31).
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of foreign aid on government' s
fiscal behaviour. We have tried to do this by using and simulating a model whic h
explicitly allows for interactions between the non-bank private sector, th e
government sector, the banking sector and the external sector and which als o
allows for supply side effects. This is in marked contrast to the existing literatur e
which only examines this issue by confining itself to the government sector.
The simulations have tried to shed light on the effects of aid o n
government's behaviour under alternate assumptions about the nature of feedbac k
effects, about the degree of fungibility and about the allocation of aid between the
public and the private sectors. The summary of the various outcomes is given i n
Table 5.   66
Table 5: total effects of foreign aid 
CG IG T Y
Foreign aid channelled through the government
No feedbacks + + -
Demand determined model + + + +
Full model (partial fungibility) + + s s
Aid for consumption only (full fungibility) + - - -
Aid for investment only (no fungibility) -/+ + -/+ +
Foreign aid channelled through the private sector
aid used as formal credit (partial fungibility) +/-  s s s
aid for investment only (no fungibility) + -/+ -/+ +
aid for consumption only (full fungibility) +/- - - -
Notes: s denotes very small; + denotes a positive effect; - denotes a negativ e
effect; +/- (-/+) denotes positive (negative) in the first simulation periods an d
negative (positive) in the later simulation periods.
The simulations should be seen as illustrative examples and not as representin g
the actual magnitudes of the various outcomes. Yet they shed light on a numbe r
of important issues. They clearly demonstrate the importance of allowing for th e
implications of interactions between different sectors in the economy fo r
examining the effects of aid on government's fiscal behaviour as well as th e
importance of allowing for supply side effects. This is shown by comparing th e
results for the "no feedbacks," the "demand determined model" and the "ful l
model," as given in Table 5. Especially, the effect of foreign aid on taxes appea r
to differ considerably. Hence, the simulations point out that an assessment of th e
effect of foreign aid on government's fiscal behaviour by only considering  a
government sector, and abstracting from supply side effects, which is done i n
nearly all existing literature in this field, may give the wrong answers. Moreover ,
the simulations show the importance of the degree of fungibility for the tota l67
effects of aid on government's expenditures and taxes. The total effects of foreign
aid on government investment and taxes are positive, at least after som e
simulation periods, in the case where foreign aid is only used for investment, o r
in other words when there is no fungibility. This holds irrespective of the wa y
how foreign aid is allocated, i.e. whether it is channelled through the governmen t
or the non-bank private sector. If foreign aid is only used for investment i t
appears that government consumption is also affected positively after som e
simulation periods. Again, this holds irrespective of the way how foreign aid i s
allocated. Thus, the simulations suggest that the way foreign aid is allocate d
between the public and the private sectors is not so crucial. What matters, though,
is how foreign aid is used. The simulations point out to the need of using aid fo r
investment purposes and show the negative implications of using aid fo r
consumption purposes.   68
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1. The model is based on Gupta and Lensink (1996).
2. For reasons of convenience Heller's distinction between "civil" and "socioeconomic "
consumption in the public sector is not taken into account.
3. This type of utility function is also used in studies of Mosley  et all (1987) and Mosley (1987).
4. This variable could also represent gold or the stock of land. It may be seen as a composite o f
highly substitutable assets, which serves as an inflation hedge.
5. Note that normally consumption fixed capital is introduced  in the definition of disposable income
of the private sector. For pragmatic reasons we, however, decided not to take consumption fixe d
capital into account in disposable income, but to subtract it from savings in order to calculate th e
increase in net wealth. Since depreciation is exogenous our assumption does not substantially affec t
the results.
6. Note, that for this last case actually foreign aid is not only used for private consumption, it i s
also, implicitly, used for foreign assets, as can be seen by figuring out the adding-up restriction fo r
the private sector.
Notes